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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
     his article tackles the question of whether international law entitles 
armed groups to detain people, as well as the separate question of what 
international law obligations bind the armed group when persons are de-
tained. The focus is on the obligations that relate to the right to challenge 
the basis for any such detention, although some attention is given to issues 
of fair trial and the question of punishment. The last part of the article 
briefly considers the legal framework governing responsibility for States 
and those that assist armed groups. State responsibility questions relating to 
attribution and assistance are considered, as are the separate rules which 
would determine the criminal responsibility of accomplices who could be 
prosecuted.  
 
II. THE PROBLEM AND THE CONTEXT   
 
In approaching the subject of detention by armed groups one has to be 
aware that assertions and assumptions one might wish to make will have 
knock-on effects with regard to the scope of States’ international obliga-
tions. For instance, the assertion that armed groups have the right to intern 
their captives quickly transits via the principle of equality of belligerents 
into an international right for States to intern those who pose an imperative 
risk to security. Similarly, a denial that armed groups have any such interna-
tional right suggests that States too have no right under the law of armed 
conflict to intern in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). Suggesting 
there is an asymmetry between the international rights of States and those 
of armed groups seems to threaten the idea that the laws of war provide 
for a “level playing field” with mutual rights and obligations. 
Putting these rather abstract issues aside, an alternative argument runs 
as follows: if we want to incentivize armed groups to respect the laws of 
war then we have to accept that, even if such groups have been banned 
under national law, some things that they do will be allowed (or at least not 
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condemned), while other things will be illegal under international law. The 
next step is to suggest that if we want them to respect the dignity of their 
captives and the due process rights of those they try, we will have to refrain 
from calling all detention by armed groups illegal. To ram home the idea, 
one can argue that if all detention by armed groups is illegal then there will 
be no incentive to detain rather than kill their captives.  
A further variation of this reasoning suggests that because the parties in 
an armed conflict can kill combatants on the other side, we must then as-
sume that they can similarly detain those they would otherwise kill. But this 
reasoning falls down on two fronts. First, States do not accept that armed 
groups have any right to kill members of its armed forces. And second, the 
issue of detention by armed groups extends beyond those who can be tar-
geted (or even killed) without violating the laws of war. Armed groups (and 
governments) may feel the need to intern non-fighters who represent a 
security threat even if such detainees have not lost their immunity from 
attack because they could not be described as members of the opposing 
armed forces or as directly participating in hostilities.  
It might seem strange that such a fundamental aspect of armed conflict 
could be considered so uncertain. How did we get to this state of affairs? I 
think a number of developments should be highlighted. In the past, a gov-
ernment had little occasion to inquire into the legality of detention by its 
armed opposition. There are multiple examples of governments dismissing 
the promulgation of laws and the conduct of criminal processes as illegiti-
mate and rebellious.1 Attempts to engage with these groups or even offer 
technical assistance have been met with warnings and even threats of pros-
ecution by certain governments.2 Such actions can even have a chilling ef-
fect on academics seeking out new ways of thinking about the laws of war 
in order to offer better protection to the victims of war. Why then invite 
more trouble and inquire further? I think that the following factors have 
forced us to take a serious look at how armed groups sit in the legal land-
scape concerning detention.  
First, the prospect of international war crimes prosecutions against in-
dividuals belonging to armed groups is a very real one. In fact, the majority 
of prosecutions are likely to be against rebel commanders rather than for-
mer heads of State, government ministers or commanders of armed forces. 
In charging a rebel leader the prosecutor may wish to rely on principles of 
                                                                                                                      
1. SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
549, 557–58 (2012). 
2. Id. at 558. 
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command or superior responsibility. In turn that may raise questions as to 
the adequacy of the disciplinary procedures that the group has in place. The 
international community of States that develops the law of war crimes can 
hardly demand adequate disciplinary laws and procedures from armed 
groups, and, in the same breath, denounce any attempt to put in place rules 
for detention and prosecution as illegal and illegitimate. This is a relatively 
new development with international prosecutions for crimes committed in 
non-international armed conflicts being unknown before 1995. The prose-
cutions in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Tribunal 
for Sierra Leone changed this.  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) now looks set to focus on 
crimes committed, not only by non-State actors, but also through the prism 
of command responsibility. The conviction of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gomba 
is based on such responsibility, with the Trial Chamber finding that “effec-
tive control” requires that the commander have the material ability to pre-
vent or repress the commission of the crimes or to submit the matter to 
the competent authorities.3 The Chamber goes on to explain that preven-
tion and repression should involve disciplinary measures, as well as 
measures to ensure justice.4 It is wildly improbable that the international 
community of States and the ICC expect rebel commanders merely to hand 
over their transgressing subordinates to State authorities. Moreover, the 
Chamber states, “In the event the commander holds disciplinary power, he 
is required to exercise it, within the limits of his competence.”5 The present 
contribution suggests that there may be limits imposed by international law 
on how that disciplinary power is exercised.  
Of course, an evaluation of the adequacy of a group’s preventive 
measures, procedures and punishment regime means taking into account 
the context. The rules applied to the commanders of the armed forces of a 
State may not simply be transposed in most cases onto rebel commanders, 
and so we already have to admit that the absolute equality of belligerents is 
not a strict rule. We will thus be looking for principles rather than detailed 
provisions.  
Second, the concept of a civil war, such as that which formed the back-
ground to the writing of the Lieber Code during the U.S. Civil War, has 
                                                                                                                      
3. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, ¶ 183 (Mar. 
21, 2016).  
4. See id. ¶¶ 188, 209. 
5. Id. ¶ 207. 
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given way to conflicts not of an international character in States where 
there may be no effective functioning government. In such a situation, 
those entities, such as the United Nations (UN), charged with the protec-
tion of civilians and human rights more generally have had to simply ad-
dress the various groups detaining people as if they were the holders of 
international obligations. In the absence of a government to protest that 
this legitimizes the behavior of these groups, the protective dimension 
takes over and we have the beginning of developed practice on how to 
name, shame and hold accountable armed groups for their detention poli-
cy. This can be seen perhaps most clearly in the 2016 report of the Office 
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya.6 
Third, the engagement of non-governmental organizations and the UN 
with various armed groups has meant that standards have had to be devel-
oped that go beyond the elements of crimes being developed in the inter-
national criminal tribunals. In some situations, there will be no governmen-
tal opposition to such engagement. Indeed, in some circumstances, UN 
commissions of inquiries have called for armed groups to punish serious 
crimes stemming from human rights abuses and violations of international 
humanitarian law (IHL),7 or “ensure respect for and act in accordance with 
international human rights law.”8  
Fourth, as long as NIACs were confined to the territory of the State 
fighting the armed group, the government had no need to rely on IHL in 
order to intern or detain those captured in the armed conflict or in coun-
terterrorism operations. Over the last twenty years, however, the armed 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to challenges to the detention 
policies of the U.S. and UK governments. In response, there have been 
claims that IHL empowers States to detain, not only prisoners of war un-
der Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention and civilians under Articles 
42 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, but also that there is a legal 
basis to detain those that pose an imperative security risk in the context of 
a NIAC.9 The arguments surrounding these claims and justifications turn in 
                                                                                                                      
6. See infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.  
7. See, e.g., Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the U.N. 
Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, ¶ 
564 (Jan. 25, 2005). 
8. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Ar-
ab Republic, ¶ 113, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011). 
9. Sean Aughey & Aurel Sari, Targeting and Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict: 
Serdar Mohammed and the Limits of Human Rights Convergence, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 60, 87–97 (2015). 
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part on whether or not the existence of such a right to intern must imply 
an equal right for the armed opposition to intern their own captives. Ar-
guments about States’ detention rights against non-State actors have 
knock-on effects. 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
A. Rights to Intern and Try in IHL? 
 
Although Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
Part II of the second 1977 Additional Protocol (AP II) both refer to the 
need to treat detainees humanely and the need to pass sentences only con-
sequent to a proper process, it is contested whether from these prohibi-
tions one can infer a power or a legal basis to detain in a non-international 
armed conflict.10 This is in part because States have traditionally relied on 
their own law to justify detention. With the advent of extraterritorial NI-
ACs, such as the conflict involving the United Kingdom and the United 
States in Afghanistan against the Taliban, the detaining States have been 
challenged to justify detention particularly with regard to their international 
human rights obligations. The United States has relied in part on the Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force11 and would probably not consider 
such detention to be in violation of any obligations under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)12 (either because it would 
not consider the Covenant applicable to these situations or because it 
would consider that any such detention was not unlawful or arbitrary under 
the terms of Article 9 or relevant customary international law). The United 
Kingdom, however, is additionally bound by a separate treaty, the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),13 and influenced by the at-
                                                                                                                      
10. See in the Court of Appeal Serdar Mohammed v. Secretary of State for Defence 
[2015] EWCA (Civ) 843 (Eng.) [hereinafter Mohammed [2015]] and in the Supreme Court 
[2017] UKSC 2 [hereinafter Mohammed [2017]]. 
11. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); 
see also Jeffrey Bovarnick & Jack Vrett, Detention Operations at the Tactical and Operational 
Levels: A Procedural Approach, in U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 
307, 313–4 (Geoffrey Corn et al. eds., 2015). 
12. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171.  
13. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
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tendant case law emanating from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR).  
The question over whether IHL provides a legal basis to detain in NI-
ACs has come to a head in two recent cases: Hassan v. United Kingdom and 
Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence. In the Hassan case,14 the ECtHR took 
the unprecedented step of essentially reading into ECHR Article 5 an im-
plied ground for detention. The Court explained that “even in situations of 
international armed conflict, the safeguards under the Convention continue 
to apply, albeit interpreted against the background of the provisions of 
international humanitarian law.”15 It then continued:  
 
By reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided by international 
humanitarian law and by the Convention in time of armed conflict, the 
grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty set out in subparagraphs (a) 
to (f) of that provision should be accommodated, as far as possible, with 
the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a 
risk to security under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.16 
 
The judgment went on to find that there had therefore been no viola-
tion of Hassan’s rights with regard to his detention in Iraq from April 23 to 
May 2, 2003. The judgment held that the human rights grounds for deten-
tion had to be satisfied and that “[t]his means that the detention must 
comply with the rules of international humanitarian law and, most im-
portantly, that it should be in keeping with the fundamental purpose of 
Article 5 § 1, which is to protect the individual from arbitrariness.”17  
One reading of the judgment is that the Court was careful to limit its 
reasoning to international armed conflict and the overlapping regimes pro-
vided by the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions: “It can only be in 
cases of international armed conflict, where the taking of prisoners of war 
and the detention of civilians who pose a threat to security are accepted 
features of international humanitarian law, that Article 5 could be interpret-
ed as permitting the exercise of such broad powers.”18 The government has 
nevertheless argued before the UK appellate courts in the Serdar Moham-
med litigation that the Hassan reasoning should apply to detention in NI-
                                                                                                                      
14. Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09 (2014) (EtCHR), http://hudoc. 
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-146501. 
15. Id. ¶ 104. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. ¶ 105.  
18. Id. ¶ 104. 
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ACs due to the authority of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council 
or the authority granted under IHL. Although both arguments were reject-
ed by the Court of Appeal, the points were appealed to the Supreme Court 
where the majority accepted that the Hassan reasoning could be applied by 
analogy to a situation where a State had been authorized by the UN Securi-
ty Council to detain in a non-international armed conflict. Lord Sumption 
put it as follows: 
 
[T]he Resolutions served the same function in a non-international armed 
conflict as the authority to detain under article 21 of the Third Geneva 
Convention does in an international armed conflict. It conferred an au-
thority in international law to detain in circumstances where this was nec-
essary for imperative reasons of security.19  
 
We will consider below the Supreme Court’s approach to the question of 
detention authorized through IHL.  
 Why does this matter for the obligations of armed non-State actors? It 
matters because the argumentation is in part tied up with an apparent wish 
not to extend to non-State actors any right to intern in a NIAC. The Court 
of Appeal in Serdar Mohammed recognized this in stating: 
 
One of the reasons why the States subscribing to what became Common 
Article 3 and APII did not make provision for a power to detain in a non-
international armed conflict was that to do so would have enabled insur-
gents to claim that the principles of equality, equivalence and reciprocity 
(which would be usual in international humanitarian law) meant that they 
would also be entitled to detain captured members of the government’s 
army.20 
 
Although the UK has argued that such a power need not be applied in 
a reciprocal way, the issue of equality of obligations under IHL continues 
to haunt this discussion. Stepping back from IHL for a moment, it is, of 
course, clear that there is no overall equality in law because detention by an 
opposition armed non-State actor will always be illegal under the national 
law of the territorial State.  
                                                                                                                      
19. Mohammed [2017], supra note 10, [44] (Lord Sumption SCJ); see also id. [65] (Lord 
Sumption SCJ); Mohammed [2015], supra note 10, [200]–[251].  
20. Mohammed [2015], supra note 10, [178]; see also Mohammed [2017], supra note 10, [10], 
[127], [158], [263]. 
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Though some assert that the principle of equality should lead to a right 
for armed groups to detain in a NIAC, such assertions are usually premised 
on the idea that States have such a right to detain.21 So far, a series of 
scholars have not found that IHL provides a legal basis to detain or intern 
in a NIAC.22 As long as the ECHR is being interpreted so as to preclude 
such a right for States, there is very little evidence that IHL grants armed 
groups any sort of right or license to detain anyone.  
In the run-up to the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
reported to delegates that “[t]he ICRC has understood from the consulta-
tions that States see a risk that regulation would imply the lawfulness of 
armed groups’ detention activities, or accord them a legal status under in-
ternational law.”23 The resulting relevant resolution of the conference 
opened with the following preambular paragraph:  
 
[M]indful that deprivation of liberty is an ordinary and expected occur-
rence in armed conflict, and that under international humanitarian law 
(IHL) States have, in all forms of armed conflict, both the power to de-
tain, and the obligation to provide protection and to respect applicable le-
gal safeguards, including against unlawful detention for all persons de-
prived of their liberty . . . .24  
 
The paragraph is remarkable for only addressing the power of States, even 
though it is concerned with “all forms of armed conflict.” 
                                                                                                                      
21. See, e.g., Ezequiel Heffes, Detention by Armed Opposition Groups in Non-International 
Armed Conflicts: Towards a New Characterization of International Humanitarian Law, 20 JOURNAL 
OF CONFLICT AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 229 (2015). 
22. See, e.g., ELS DEBUF, CAPTURED IN WAR: LAWFUL INTERNMENT IN ARMED CON-
FLICT (2013); LAWRENCE HILL-CAWTHORNE, DETENTION IN NON-INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT (2016); Laura M. Olson, Security Detention: The International Legal Frame-
work: Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity between International Humanitarian 
and Human Rights Law—Demonstrated by the Procedural Regulation of Internment in Non-
International Armed Conflict, 40 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 437 (2009).  
23. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, STRENGTHENING INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW PROTECTING PERSONS DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIBERTY: 
CONCLUDING REPORT 32 (2015), http://rcrcconference.org/wp-content/uploads/sites 
/3/2015/04/32IC-Concluding-report-on-persons-deprived-of-their-liberty_EN.pdf.  
24. International Committee of the Red Cross, Strengthening International Humanitarian 
Law Protecting Persons Deprived of their Liberty: Resolution (2015), http://rcrcconference.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/04/32IC-AR-Persons-deprived-of-liberty_EN.pdf. 
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The majority in the Supreme Court, having determined that a Security 
Council resolution could provide the necessary authority to detain, had no 
need to determine the possible authority to detain derived from IHL. Lord 
Reed, however, who dissented and was joined by Lord Kerr, disagreed that 
a Security Council resolution could provide such authority, and so was 
obliged to consider in detail the arguments concerning IHL and, in his 
words given the “importance of the issues, and the potential influence of 
this court’s decision . . . prepare a reasoned judgment.”25 He concluded that 
neither treaty-based IHL nor customary IHL provided authority for deten-
tion in a non-international armed conflict.26 Lord Sumption from the ma-
jority stated that “Common article 3 does not in terms confer a right of 
detention”27 and that he was “inclined to agree with [Lord Reed]” that the 
detention of members of the opposing armed forces is not sanctioned by 
customary international law in a non-international armed conflict.28 Never-
theless, Lord Sumption also stated that the “lack of international consensus 
really reflects differences among states about the appropriate limits of the 
right of detention, the conditions of its exercise and the extent to which 
special provision should be made for non-state actors.”29  
The ICRC position on this issue with regard to Common Article 3, as 
explained in its 2016 Commentary (published since the adoption of the Reso-
lution), seems at first glance to build on the Resolution and adopt the idea 
that “both customary and international humanitarian treaty law contain an 
inherent power to detain in non-international armed conflict.”30 The Com-
mentary here references the preambular paragraph of the Resolution, but 
then continues, “However, additional authority related to the grounds and 
procedure for deprivation of liberty in non-international armed conflict 
must in all cases be provided, in keeping with the principle of legality.”31 
We have then an apparent distinction between the inherent power to detain 
and the need for “additional authority” for the “grounds” for detention. 
                                                                                                                      
25. Mohammed [2017], supra note 10, [235] (Lord Reed SCJ).  
26. Id. [234]–[276] (Lord Reed SCJ).  
27. Id. [12] (Lord Sumption SCJ).  
28. Id. [14] (Lord Sumption SCJ). 
29. Id. [16] (Lord Sumption SCJ); see also id. [148], [158] (Lord Mance SCJ). 
30. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED 
AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCE IN THE FIELD ¶ 728 (2d ed. 2016), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId 
=59F6CDFA490736C1C1257F7D004BA0EC [hereinafter 2016 ICRC COMMENTARY].  
31. Id.   
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The Commentary does not seem to limit this power to States. Indeed, 
when looking at the meaning of the phrase “regularly constituted court” 
which appears in Common Article 3, the ICRC addresses the dilemma 
head on: 
 
Common Article 3 requires “a regularly constituted court.” If this would 
refer exclusively to State courts constituted according to domestic law, 
non-State armed groups would not be able to comply with this require-
ment. The application of this rule in common Article 3 to “each Party to 
the conflict” would then be without effect. Therefore, to give effect to 
this provision, it may be argued that courts are regularly constituted as 
long as they are constituted according to the “laws” of the armed group. 
Alternatively, armed groups could continue to operate existing courts ap-
plying existing legislation.32   
 
Article 6(2) of AP II uses a different wording precisely to capture the 
idea that armed non-State actors may be creating their own courts. It re-
places the expression “regularly constituted court” with “a court offering 
the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality.”33 The Elements 
of Crimes of the ICC build on this and explain that a court would not be 
regularly constituted court if it did not “afford the essential guarantees of 
independence and impartiality, or the court that rendered judgement did 
not afford all other judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensa-
ble under international law.”34  
We can conclude that armed non-State actors that constitute parties to 
an armed conflict have international obligations under Common Article 3, 
AP II and the parallel customary international law obligations (perhaps  
most conveniently seen as reflected more or less in Article 75 of Additional 
Protocol I (AP I)) to abstain from sentencing anyone unless such action 
would be the result of a fair trial conducted by an independent and impar-
tial court which afforded the indispensable guarantees recognized by inter-
national law.35 While the parameters of these elements of the obligation will 
                                                                                                                      
32. Id. ¶ 692 (footnote omitted).  
33. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 6(2), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II].  
34. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes art. 8(2)(c)(iv) element 4, U.N. 
Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9. 2002), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ElementsofCrim 
es_English.pdf.  
35. See Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 
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be examined in the next section, it follows from this that armed non-State 
actors do indeed have international obligations under IHL towards those 
they detain. Even if armed groups may not necessarily be entitled or em-
powered under international law to detain or try anyone, once they do en-
gage in these activities it seems incontrovertible that such groups have ex-
plicit and detailed obligations under international law. According to the 
ICRC, it is “undisputed that the substantive provisions of common Article 
3 bind . . . armed groups when they are party to an armed conflict.”36 Of 
course, the theory on how international law comes to bind such groups is 
still being articulated and remains to some extent contested.37 
 
B. Duties of the Armed Group in IHL 
 
Our conclusion so far points to a lack of rights for armed groups to try and 
detain, yet suggests that there are relevant obligations on the armed groups 
once they engage in such activities. Such a conclusion is wide open to criti-
cism. How, the critics might say, can we ask these groups to develop rules 
and procedures for the treatment of detainees if all detention is illegal? 
Taken to its logical conclusion, it could be argued: if there is no right to 
detain then detention per se is illegal and any detention could be seen as a 
war crime or a form of hostage-taking under international law. But this 
                                                                                                                      
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3; AP II, supra note 33, art. 6(2). Article 75 can be seen as including rules that 
ought to be applied (whether or not they are customary international law) in non-
international armed conflict. See John Bellinger, Obama’s Announcements on International Law, 
LAWFARE (Mar. 8, 2011, 8:33 PM.), https://www.lawfareblog.com/obamas-announcemen 
ts-international-law (“My assumption is that the Administration does plan to apply Article 
75 to al Qaida and the Taliban and that it does not agree with (or overlooked) the Su-
preme Court’s conclusion that the conflict is a non-international armed conflict.”). Con-
sider also the May 22, 1992 agreement between the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina which requires of the non-State parties that “All civilians shall be treated in 
accordance with Articles 72 to 79 of Additional Protocol I.” Agreement No. 1 ¶ 2.3.2, 
Bosn.-Herz., May 22, 1992, reprinted in 3 HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 117 (Marco 
Sassòli et al. eds., 3d ed. 2011). 
36. 2016 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 30, ¶ 508.  
37. DARAGH MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ARMED 
GROUPS (2016); Katharine Fortin, The Application of Human Rights Law to Everyday Civilian 
Life under Rebel Control, 63 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 161 (2016); 
Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Addresses of Common Article 3, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVEN-
TIONS: A COMMENTARY 415 (Andrew Clapham et al. eds., 2015). 
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argument represents an unacceptable jump in the logic. It is one thing to 
say that IHL does not authorize detention or internment; it is quite another 
to say that such behavior constitutes a war crime. The analogy might be 
that armed non-State actors do not enjoy combatant immunity and the 
right to participate in hostilities (unless the special conditions in Article 1(4) 
of AP I are met38), but this does not mean that their (non-perfidious) at-
tacks on the armed forces of a State in a combat situation can be prosecut-
ed as an international war crime. The acts may constitute murder under 
national law, but such acts are not criminal under the international statutes 
adopted for the international criminal tribunals.  
Detention by an armed group might constitute some sort of unlawful 
confinement or even hostage-taking under national law, but in order for 
this to become an offense under the International Convention on Hostage-
Taking there would need to be the element that someone is being held in 
order to compel some other entity to do something.39 If the detention was 
simply to avoid releasing the captive back on to the battlefield, or arguably 
with a view to an eventual prisoner exchange, then such detention would 
not fall under the international definitions of hostage-taking either as a war 
crime or under the Convention.40 The distinction between hostage-taking 
and the detention of members of the armed forces taken in combat opera-
tions is highlighted in the 2016 Colombian peace agreement with the Fuer-
zas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). While on the one hand per-
sons who engaged in hostage-taking and other severe deprivations of phys-
ical liberty are considered to be ineligible for amnesty or pardon, on the 
other hand those involved in the apprehension of personnel from the mili-
tary forces during military operations may be eligible for pardon or amnesty 
(as a crime related to the rebellion) on a case-by-case basis.41 
                                                                                                                      
38. Armed conflicts in which “peoples are fighting against colonial domination and al-
ien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination,” and the authority representing such a people has undertaken to apply the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the Protocol by addressing a unilateral declaration to the 
depositary (the Swiss Federal Council) under Article 96(3). 
39. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages art. 1, Dec. 17, 1979, 
T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205. 
40. David Tuck, Taking Hostages, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 37, at 297; Deborah Casalin, Taking Prisoners: Reviewing the International 
Humanitarian Law Grounds for Deprivation of Liberty by Armed Opposition Groups, 93 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 743 (2011).  
41. See especially Part 5.1.2 of the Agreement paragraphs 37–40 and Article 22 para-
graph, literal (a) of the Amnesty Law, where the following are ineligible for amnesty: “la 
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To the extent that armed groups commit not to engage in hostage-
taking, one may need to inquire into the scope of such commitments. As 
Sivakumaran shows with regard to the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) 
of Colombia: 
 
[I]t has defined the taking of hostages in such a manner as to allow cer-
tain actions that the law of armed conflict would consider to constitute 
the taking of hostages. Thus, the ELN has stated that it is “permissible to 
recover war taxes, and to detain persons who refuse to pay them as a 
form of pressure in order to obtain payment. These detentions cannot be 
considered ‘hostage-taking,’ because we never use these persons as shields 
during hostilities.”42 
 
Those engaging with armed groups might want to reflect that one man’s 
hostage-taker is another man’s tax collector. 
So we can conclude that there are no criminal offenses in IHL related 
to the mere fact of detention by an armed group (even if all detention, in-
cluding hostage-taking, is likely to be a violation of national law).  
What then are the international duties that flow once someone is de-
tained by an armed group in a NIAC? Let us now separate out the rights of 
those detained as something akin to “security detainees,” from those who 
are to be subjected to some sort of quasi-judicial process with a view to 
disciplinary action or conviction.  
A detailed examination of all the obligations under Common Article 3, 
AP II (Articles 4, 5 and 6) and customary international law are beyond the 
scope of this article, which focuses on the due process rights rather than 
the conditions of detention.43 Of course, any detainee must be treated hu-
                                                                                                                      
toma de rehenes u otra privación grave de la libertad,” while the same Article 22 in its first 
part indicates that “La Sala de Amnistía e Indulto concederá las amnistías por los delitos 
políticos o conexos. En todo caso, se entienden conexos con el delito político los delitos 
que reúnan alguno de los siguientes criterios: . . . ‘la aprehensión de combatientes efectu-
ada en operaciones militares.’” 
42. Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lessons for the Law of Armed Conflict from the Commitments of 
Armed Groups: Identification of Legitimate Targets of Prisoners of War, 93 INTERNATIONAL RE-
VIEW OF THE RED CROSS 463, 474 (2011).  
43. For more information on the law applicable to the conditions of detention, see 
LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIMES OF CONFLICT AND TERRORISM 194–
250 (2011); Louise Doswald-Beck, Judicial Guarantees under Common Article 3, in THE 1949 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 37, at 469; see also SIVAKUMARAN, 
supra note 1, at 292–300; 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW rr. 87–103 
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manely and must not be tortured or subjected to any sort of sexual vio-
lence. But our focus will be on the right to challenge the detention and the 
fair trial guarantees. 
Whether or not one agrees with our conclusion that armed groups have 
no right to detain derived from international law, it seems clear that any 
detention in an armed conflict must be open to challenge. In some recent 
conflicts the dividing line between the State and non-State forces and their 
detention regimes has seemed flimsy, leading Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) investigators in Libya to apply 
the terms “detention” and “detention facilities” to deprivation of liberty by 
both the State and armed groups.44 With regards to any justification of dep-
rivation of liberty, the report states:  
 
Under customary international law, any security related detention must be 
justified by the existence of a present, direct and imperative threat by the 
individual concerned, and is subject to strict procedural requirements in-
cluding that the person may effectively challenge the lawfulness of the de-
tention, that the detention does not last any longer than absolutely neces-
sary, and that there be initial and periodic reviews by an independent 
body possessing the same attributes of independence and impartiality as 
the judiciary.45 
 
Elsewhere the report clarifies that even if legally sanctioned, detention will 
be arbitrary “if it is otherwise inappropriate, unjust, unreasonable, or un-
necessary in the circumstances.”46  
 
1. Procedural Safeguards that Allow for Challenges to Detention 
  
Little attention has been given to detailing what procedural safeguards ap-
ply to detainees challenging the lawfulness or arbitrariness of their deten-
tion by armed groups. To the extent that the ICRC’s procedural safeguards 
                                                                                                                      
(Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL]; MURRAY, 
supra note 37. 
44. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya, 
Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: 
Detailed Findings, ¶ 130, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/CRP.3 (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.ohchr. 
org/Documents/Countries/LY/A_HRC_31_CRP_3.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights in 
Libya Report]. 
45. Id. ¶ 128. 
46. Id. ¶ 126. 
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and principles governing detention go beyond binding international law, it 
is suggested that they should be applied by armed groups “[w]here practi-
cally feasible.”47 Others have tentatively suggested that where an armed 
group has stable control over territory and the population the law of bellig-
erent occupation should be applied by analogy.48  
Without wishing to undermine the rather more extensive obligations 
that would apply to the State in any armed conflict, or indeed the additional 
rights that may apply under international human rights law (which we will 
discuss later), we might venture the following minimum guarantees that 
ought to apply to someone seeking to challenge detention by an armed 
group: 
 
1. An effective right to challenge the arbitrariness of any detention 
before an impartial body capable of ordering release.  
 
2. The right not be subject to prohibited discrimination with re-
gard to the grounds for detention or during the process for chal-
lenging the detention. 
 
3. That there be a reasonable necessity for the detention, such as 
the prevention of crime, the threat of serious prejudice to the secu-
rity of the group, or the preparation of a criminal or disciplinary 
case.  
 
These safeguards do not imply that there is any law that entitles an 
armed group to intern people based on status, it simply admits that, in fact, 
people are detained by armed groups and that those groups will be in 
breach of the international norm that prohibits arbitrary detention should 
they fail to respect these guarantees. There is a sort of parallelism here with 
the logic that states that even if armed groups are not entitled by interna-
tional law to set up courts and try people, if they do have courts then they 
must pass sentence only where certain fundamental due process rights or 
“judicial guarantees” have been respected.  
 
                                                                                                                      
47. See Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Deten-
tion in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE 
RED CROSS 375, 376 (2005). 
48. MURRAY, supra note 37, at 233, 241; Casalin, supra note 40, at 754–56. 
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2. Judicial Guarantees under Common Article 3 
  
The minimal safeguards proposed above relate only to the challenge to the 
legitimacy of detention and do not provide what are known as the “judicial 
guarantees” that are demanded by Common Article 3 to the Geneva Con-
ventions in the context of actual sentences passed down by a court. To 
recall, this clause, which applies to all parties in a NIAC, prohibits the 
“passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peo-
ples.” In turn, under international law, an individual may be prosecuted for 
the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process. Under the 
ICC Statute, such a war crime would apply to relevant individuals from the 
non-State party to a NIAC.49 As we saw above, the Elements of Crimes 
adopted by the States parties explain that a “regularly constituted court” in 
this context means a court that affords the essential guarantees of “inde-
pendence and impartiality.”50 Commentators at this point turn to human 
rights law to flesh out what constitutes impartiality or independence.51 In 
the context of an armed conflict which has triggered the application of AP 
II, these guarantees are spelled out in Article 6(2). For completeness we 
might add that although Article 75 of AP I applies as a matter of treaty law 
to international armed conflicts, the guarantees that it contains are increas-
ingly seen as customary and applicable in NIACs.52 
Most recently, the 2016 ICRC Commentary on Common Article 3 details 
the appropriate judicial guarantees. In doing so, its authors were conscious 
of the fact that these have to be adapted to apply to armed groups and that 
the list of guarantees in AP II may not be complete:  
 
684. While common Article 3 does not list specific judicial guarantees, 
Article 6 of Additional Protocol II does, and the requirement of fair trial 
in common Article 3 today has to be interpreted in the light of these pro-
visions and their customary equivalent. As follows from the phrase “in 
                                                                                                                      
49. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(c)(iv), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  
50. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.   
51. KNUT DÖRMANN ET AL., ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STAT-
UTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SOURCES AND COMMENTARY 408–38 
(2003). 
52. Sandra L. Hodgkinson, Detention Operations: A Strategic View, in U.S. MILITARY OP-
ERATIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 275, 282 (Geoffrey S. Corn et al. eds., 2016). 
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particular” in Article 6, this list is not exhaustive but spells out the mini-
mum guarantees of fair trial that are generally recognized as indispensable 
under international law today. The judicial guarantees listed in Article 6 of 
Additional Protocol II are considered customary today.  
 
685. Thus, judicial guarantees that are generally recognized as indispensa-
ble today include, as a minimum: 
– the obligation to inform the accused without delay of the nature 
and cause of the offence alleged;  
– the requirement that an accused have the necessary rights and 
means of defence;  
– the right not to be convicted of an offence except on the basis of 
individual penal responsibility;  
– the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (“no crime or pun-
ishment without a law”) and the prohibition of a heavier penalty than 
that provided for at the time of the offence;  
– the right to be presumed innocent;  
– the right to be tried in one’s own presence;  
– the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess 
guilt; 
– the right to be advised of one’s judicial and other remedies and of 
the time-limits within which they may be exercised. 
. . . . 
 
686. A similar list is provided in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, 
which has also been found to be relevant in this context. Both lists were 
inspired by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Arti-
cle 75 lists three additional guarantees: 
– the right to present and examine witnesses; 
– the right to have the judgment pronounced publicly; 
– the right not to be prosecuted or punished more than once by the 
same Party for the same act or on the same charge (non bis in idem). 
 
687. The first two of these additional guarantees were not included in 
Additional Protocol II in response to the wish of some delegates to keep 
the list as short as possible. Arguably, however, they should apply in non-
international armed conflict to the extent that they are essential to a fair 
trial and they appear in the main human rights instruments. The third 
guarantee, the principle of non bis in idem, was not included because “this 
principle could not apply between the courts of the government and the 
courts of the rebels.” It may thus be argued, a contrario, that it should ap-
ply as a prohibition of double jeopardy of prosecution or punishment by 
the same Party, in the same manner as this principle is formulated in Arti-
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cle 75 of Additional Protocol I. A second trial by the same Party for the 
same act or on the same charge, after a final judgment acquitting or con-
victing the person concerned, should be deemed unfair.53 
 
These judicial guarantees rather presume that the accused is facing a 
criminal charge rather than being disciplined for a breach of internal rules, 
but in many cases the disciplinary charge may relate to facts which could 
constitute a war crime. Failure to mete out appropriate punishment for a 
war crime could indeed expose the commander or superior to prosecution 
in the ICC under Article 28(a)(ii) of the Statute for failure to act to “pre-
vent or repress” the commission of those war crimes.54 It would make 
sense for those engaging with armed groups to explain that setting up pro-
cedures for the investigation and punishment of war crimes is an expecta-
tion that needs to be fulfilled. This should be encouraged even if the doc-
trine claims that the “customary IHL obligation with regard to investigating 
and prosecuting serious violations of IHL committed in non-international 
armed conflict rests only with states.”55  
Not surprisingly international tribunals focus on situations where there 
have been inadequate or non-existent recourse to disciplinary measures 
rather than heralding appropriate investigations. Sivakumaran has summa-
rized some of the characteristics of courts set up by armed groups in the 
Philippines, Nepal, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kosovo, Ireland, India and My-
anmar.56 Bangerter has identified the various internal codes that have been 
applied by armed groups in Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and South Sudan, Uganda, Co-
lombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Afghanistan, China, India, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Vietnam, Turkey and the United Kingdom.57 
The present author is not aware, however, of any detailed ongoing critical 
                                                                                                                      
53. 2016 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 30 (footnotes omitted).  
54. Rome Statute, supra note 49, art. 28(a)(ii). 
55. Olson, supra note 22, at 452. 
56. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 1, at 549–62; Sandesh Sivakumaran, Courts of Armed Op-
position: Fair Trials or Summary Justice?, 7 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
489 (2009); see also Jonathan Somer,  Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality of Belligerents 
in Non-International Armed Conflict, 89 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 655 
(2007). 
57. OLIVER BANGERTER, INTERNAL CONTROL: CODES OF CONDUCT WITHIN IN-
SURGENT GROUPS (2012), http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasion 
al-papers/SAS-OP31-internal-control.pdf.  
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reporting of the disciplinary measures actually taken by armed groups. The 
explanation for such a dearth of contemporary material is not hard to find. 
International organizations may be fearful of seeming to legitimize a group 
through monitoring its trials and courts where such a group is seeking to 
overthrow one of their member States. Additionally, as Sivakumaran high-
lights, those non-governmental organizations that do venture into this field 
risk being prosecuted under the relevant national law either as trainers, 
advisers or observers.58  
One specific criticism of an armed group providing inadequate judicial 
guarantees can be found in Philip Alston’s 2008 report on the Philippines 
as the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Exe-
cutions. He concludes that a denial of due process by a group would con-
stitute a violation of IHL.59 Alston detailed that: 
 
While the “Basic Rules of the New People’s Army” includes a list of of-
fences that are to be punished by expulsion and death when committed 
by members of the NPA—“treachery, capitulation, abandonment of post, 
espionage, sabotage, mutiny, inciting for rebellion, murder, theft, rape, ar-
son and severe malversation of people’s funds” . . . —neither this nor any 
other instrument cited actually defines the elements of any criminal of-
fence.60  
 
In other contexts, UN reports have remained at a more general level, 
with, for example, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria concluding in 
2016 that: 
 
In instituting makeshift courts whose procedures fall far short of fair trial 
standards, the responsible groups violated due process principles, in vio-
lation of international humanitarian and human rights law. Executions 
ordered by these makeshift, unauthorised courts constitute killings or 
summary executions in violation of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law.61  
 
                                                                                                                      
58. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 1, at 558. 
59. Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execu-
tions), Mission to the Philippines, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/3/Add.2 (Apr. 16, 2008).  
60. Id. at 40 n.44. 
61. U.N. Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syri-
an Arab Republic, ¶ 101, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/CRP.1 (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.ohchr. 
org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-31-CRP1_en.pdf.   
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IV. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
The resistance to including non-State actors as possible bearers of human 
rights obligations and therefore possible human rights violators continues 
in various fora and at a doctrinal level.62 Such resistance is not helpful to a 
protective agenda and can be explained on a couple of levels. It stems at 
one level from a legal analysis which focuses on the fact that human rights 
treaties are ratified by States and not by armed groups. From this it is pre-
sumed that human rights obligations are the business of States, perhaps in 
part due to a historical sense that human rights treaties reflect constitution-
al arrangements. And at another level it stems from a political reticence to 
allow a seeming “recognition” of armed groups by treating them as if they 
were States subject to international human rights obligations. The fact that 
such groups are said to be bound by IHL, rather than bolstering the case 
for human rights law to apply to armed groups, actually only exacerbates 
the controversy as this viewpoint is used as a reminder that the rationales 
of IHL and human rights are separate with distinct features, and that con-
vergence in this area would undermine the complementarity and coherence 
of the regimes.63  
These debates in the end mask concerns about the place of non-State 
actors in international relations and the perceived need to patrol the fron-
tiers of different branches or disciplines. They also reveal that there may be 
competing views on the concept of human rights.64 In the context of de-
tention by armed groups there is little point in dwelling on the question of 
whether these groups are bound as such by the relevant human rights trea-
ties; the reality is that the treaty body mechanisms will probably not be 
                                                                                                                      
62. See, e.g., Nigel Rodley, Non-State Actors and Human Rights, in ROUTLEDGE HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 523 (Scott Sheeran et al. eds., 2013); 
Christian Tomuschat, The Applicability of Human Rights Law to Insurgent Movements, in 
KRISENSICHERUNG UND HUMANITÄRER SCHUTZ – CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANI-
TARIAN PROTECTION: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR DIETER FLECK 573 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 
2004); LIESBETH ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (2002); Yaël Ronen, Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State 
Actors, 46 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 21 (2013); Tilman Rodenhäuser, 
International Legal Obligations of Armed Opposition Groups in Syria, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 
OF LAW (2015), http://www.qscience.com/doi/pdf/10.5339/irl.2015.2. 
63. See Olson, supra note 22. 
64. See, e.g., Manfred Nowak & Karolina M. Januszewski, Non-State Actors under Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 113, 124–32 
(Math Noortmann et al. eds., 2015); ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRI-
VATE SPHERE 124–49 (1993). 
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available to the victims of any violations. This is explained by Greenwood, 
who wrote: 
 
The obligations created by international humanitarian law apply not just 
to states but to individuals and to non-state actors such as a rebel faction 
or secessionist movement in a civil war. The application to non-state ac-
tors of human rights treaties is more problematic and even if they may be 
regarded as applicable in principle, the enforcement machinery created by 
human rights treaties can normally be invoked only in proceedings against 
a state.65  
 
The human rights obligations of these groups nevertheless concern us 
because the UN human rights mechanisms, as well as certain regional 
mechanisms and non-governmental organizations, need to report on the 
human rights records of these groups, and these monitors are in need of a 
relevant legal framework. Human rights law rather than IHL may be crucial 
because either the group is not organized enough to constitute a party to an 
internal armed conflict and therefore there is no applicable binding IHL, or 
because the monitoring body may be confined to considering only human 
rights law. Moreover, as the scholarship by Katharine Fortin persuasively 
demonstrates, even during an armed conflict “life goes on” and there may 
be various instances of detention and trial by armed groups that are unre-
lated to the conflict.66 In such cases there would be no nexus for the pur-
poses of war crimes law; indeed one might even argue that IHL itself might 
not apply.67  
The authors of a report on Libya by OHCHR explain their rationale 
for applying human rights law to armed groups: “The present report 
adopts the approach that non-State actors who exercise government-like 
functions and control over a territory are obliged to respect human rights 
norms when their conduct affects the human rights of the individuals un-
der their control.”68 In this detailed report on Libya OHCHR refers to de-
                                                                                                                      
65. Christopher Greenwood, The Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE HANDBOOK 
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 76 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2007).  
66. Fortin, supra note 37, at 167. 
67. Id. at 170–79.  
68. Human Rights in Libya Report, supra note 44, ¶ 29; see also Final Report of The  
International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic, transmitted by 
Letter Dated 22 December 2014 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, ¶ 107, U.N. Doc. S/2014/928 (Dec. 22, 2014) (footnotes omitted) 
(“Debates that took place in the late part of the twentieth century as to whether such non-
state actors are nevertheless bound by the standards of international human rights law, 
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tainees “arbitrarily detained” by “armed group members” and “denied their 
basic legal rights.”69 While there are multiple references to “violations and 
abuses” in an obvious nod towards those who insist on the doctrinal dis-
tinction between human rights violations by the State and abuses commit-
ted by an armed group, in the end the report considers that either a State or 
a non-State actor can engage in arbitrary detention and deny basic legal 
rights.70 There is no suggestion that “abuses” do not constitute denial of 
legal rights, and in the section on enforced disappearances the authors of 
the report reveal the arbitrariness of any such distinction due to the shifting 
alliances between the various groups and the government. In a footnote 
justifying the use of the expression “enforced disappearance” to cover the 
acts of non-State actors, they explain:  
 
In the present report, the term “disappearance” refers to enforced disap-
pearances committed by the State as well as disappearances committed by 
armed groups. It is intended to reflect both the various legal regimes ap-
plicable to enforced disappearances and the factual complexity in Libya 
vis-à-vis the status of armed groups, many of which were theoretically 
brought under State ministries . . . .71  
 
In fact, human rights treaty law clearly encompasses disappearances by 
armed groups. Article 3 of the UN Convention on Enforced Disappear-
ances demands that “[e]ach State Party shall take appropriate measures to 
investigate acts defined in article 2 committed by persons or groups of per-
sons acting without the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State 
and to bring those responsible to justice.”72 When the UN reports on such 
acts they address and name the groups as such and do not simply generical-
ly remind the States of their responsibilities. The fact that the groups do 
not report to the relevant treaty body is rather irrelevant in the process of 
defining the normative framework and detailing the incidents which have 
led to a “denial of legal rights.” It remains likely that individuals could face 
                                                                                                                      
have today been replaced by a general understanding that non-state groups that exercise de 
facto control over territory must respect human rights in their activities.”); Steven R. Rat-
ner, Accountability and the Sri Lankan Civil War, 106 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 795, 801 (2012). 
69. Human Rights in Libya Report, supra note 44, ¶ 138. 
70. See id. ¶¶ 125, 296. 
71. Id. ¶ 153 n.178. 
72. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Dis-
appearance, Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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prosecutions for the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance, 
whether or not they are State actors as long as this was pursuant to or in 
furtherance of an organizational policy to commit an attack directed against 
any civilian population.73 
For a more general look at the list of international human rights obliga-
tions attached to armed groups we might consider the UN human rights 
report on the conflict in South Sudan: 
 
The most basic human rights obligations, in particular those emanating 
from peremptory international law (ius cogens) bind both the State and 
armed opposition groups in times of peace and during armed conflict. In 
particular, international human rights law requires States, armed groups 
and others to respect the prohibitions of extrajudicial killing, maiming, 
torture, cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, enforced 
disappearance, rape, other conflict related sexual violence, sexual and 
other forms of slavery, the recruitment and use of children in hostilities, 
arbitrary detention as well as of any violations that amount to war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, or genocide.74 
  
This, of course, raises the question what counts as arbitrary detention by an 
armed group. As we saw in the section on IHL, one could consider that all 
detention by an armed group is illegal as it is not authorized under the 
State’s legal order. Perhaps the way forward is to separate out unlawful 
detention from arbitrary detention.  
The UN Human Rights Committee explained in its General Comment 
35:  
 
The notion of “arbitrariness” is not to be equated with “against the law,” 
but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropri-
ateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as well as 
elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality. . . . Aside from 
judicially imposed sentences for a fixed period of time, the decision to 
keep a person in any form of detention is arbitrary if it is not subject to 
periodic re-evaluation of the justification for continuing the detention.75  
 
                                                                                                                      
73. Rome Statute, supra note 49, art. 7(2)(a). 
74. United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Conflict in South Sudan: A 
Human Rights Report, ¶ 18 (May 8, 2014), https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files 
/unmiss_conflict_in_south_sudan_-_a_human_rights_report.pdf. 
75. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35: Article 9 (Liberty and 
Security of Person), ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014). 
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While they were here addressing the obligations of States parties to the 
ICCPR, the UN bodies engaged in field monitoring, for example as we saw 
with Libya, are using a similar sense of what constitutes arbitrary detention 
when reporting on the denial of legal rights by armed groups.  
With regard to fair trial, it is harder to pull out the applicable norms be-
cause, as already mentioned, monitors are fearful of justifying detention 
and trial by armed groups. But to the extent that UN reports, such as the 
one on Libya, assert that “non-State actors who exercise government-like 
functions and control over a territory are obliged to respect human rights 
norms when their conduct affects the human rights of the individuals un-
der their control,”76 let us flesh out the human rights norms that would 
apply in challenging arbitrary detention, and then look in a second section 
on rights related to fair trial.  
 
A.  Challenging Arbitrary Detention and Some Proposed Procedural Safeguards 
 
With regard to the “periodic re-evaluation” mentioned by the UN Human 
Rights Committee, we might take some inspiration from the minimal rights 
suggested by the ECtHR in the context of the internment of security de-
tainees in occupied territory. In Hassan, the Court suggested that  
 
the “competent body” should provide sufficient guarantees of impartiality 
and fair procedure to protect against arbitrariness. Moreover, the first re-
view should take place shortly after the person is taken into detention, 
with subsequent reviews at frequent intervals, to ensure that any person 
who does not fall into one of the categories subject to internment under 
international humanitarian law is released without undue delay.77  
 
While the armed group does not have the same right to intern certain indi-
viduals that a State will have in an international armed conflict, the idea 
that there should be an impartial body able to order release and to hear 
requests shortly after detention makes sense and could be adapted to an 
armed group depending on the context. In 2017, the UK Supreme Court in 
the Serdar Mohammed judgment considered the parameters of what the min-
imal procedural guarantees might be for a State in the context of a non-
international armed conflict. The judgment of Lord Sumption offers the 
                                                                                                                      
76. Human Rights in Libya Report, supra note 44, ¶ 29. 
77. Hassan, supra note 14, ¶ 106. 
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following prescription as to what he considered impartiality should mean 
for a State in these circumstances: 
 
What is required is not just impartiality in fact, but the appearance of im-
partiality and the existence of sufficient institutional guarantees of impar-
tiality. I would accept that it may be unrealistic to require military deten-
tion in a war zone to be reviewed by a body independent of the army or, 
more generally, of the executive, especially if reviews are to be conducted 
with the promptness and frequency required. But it is difficult to conceive 
that there can be sufficient institutional guarantees of impartiality if the 
reviewing authority is not independent of those responsible for authoris-
ing the detention under review, as it commonly is in the practice of other 
countries including the United States.78 
 
Lord Sumption also helpfully distilled the minimum conditions for fairness 
in this context: 
 
There is no treaty and no consensus specifying what fairness involves as a 
matter of international humanitarian law. But some basic principles must 
be regarded as essential to any fair process of adjudication. In the present 
context, the minimum conditions for fairness were (i) that the internee 
should be told, so far as possible without compromising secret material, 
the gist of the facts which are said to make his detention necessary for 
imperative reasons of security; (ii) that the review procedure should be 
explained to him; (iii) that he should be allowed sufficient contact with 
the outside world to be able to obtain evidence of his own; and (iv) that 
he should be entitled to make representations, preferably in person but if 
that is impractical then in some other effective manner.79    
 
In the previous section we ventured three minimal obligations for an 
armed group detaining people in the context of an armed conflict.80 These 
obligations were drawn from the practice and dynamics of IHL. Should we 
similarly venture some minimal “habeas corpus style” adapted rights in the 
context of human rights law? I would suggest that there is some purpose in 
such an exercise.  
First, in today’s conflicts there is often uncertainty or political opposi-
tion to the application of IHL. This can be because the groups have not 
                                                                                                                      
78. Mohammed [2017], supra note 10, [105] (Lord Sumption SCJ). 
79. Id. [107] (Lord Sumption SCJ); see also id. [209]–[219] (Lord Mance SCJ). 
80. See supra Part III. 
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necessarily reached the level of organization to trigger the application of 
IHL (as we saw in Syria at the beginning of the unrest), or because the level 
of violence may not be such as to be considered intense or protracted 
enough to merit the application of IHL (as was seen at certain points with 
Boko Haram), or because the fighting has ceased yet the groups retain con-
trol over territory and parts of the population and are exercising judicial 
and law enforcement functions (as was seen in Nepal).81  
Second, where a commission of inquiry has been established with a 
human rights mandate it will inevitably have to report on abuses by the 
armed group. Depending on the capacity and circumstances of the group it 
is unlikely that the full range of treaty obligations of the State can be trans-
posed onto the non-State actor. Attempting to adapt a so-called “hard 
core” or set of non-derogable rights as applied to States seems to miss the 
point. The question is what can be expected of armed groups in such cir-
cumstances. I think one can reiterate the three basic minimum guarantees 
we presented in the section on IHL, worth repeating as there may be situa-
tions where IHL does not apply and the obligations stem entirely from 
human rights law:  
  
1. An effective right to challenge the arbitrariness of any detention 
before an impartial body capable of ordering release.  
 
2. The right not to be subject to prohibited discrimination with re-
gard to the grounds for detention or during the process for chal-
lenging the detention. 
 
3. That there be a reasonable necessity for the detention, such as 
the prevention of crime, the threat of serious prejudice to the secu-
rity of the group, or the preparation of a criminal, or disciplinary 
case.  
                                                                                                                      
81. Frederick Rawski, Engaging with Armed Groups: A Human Rights Field Perspective from 
Nepal, 6 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW REVIEW 601 (2009). Some IHL guaran-
tees may continue even in the absence of the threshold criteria for the application of IHL 
in a NIAC, and where there is no acceptance that armed groups have human rights obliga-
tions there may be policy reasons which favor an extension of the application of IHL 
beyond what is normally understood as the conflict. See Marko Milanovic, The End of Ap-
plication of International Humanitarian Law, 96 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 
163, 181 (2014). The ICRC suggests that the conflict is at an end when there is “a lasting 
cessation of armed confrontations without real risk of resumption.” 2016 ICRC COM-
MENTARY, supra note 30, ¶ 491.  
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And we can perhaps add some more. 
In his scholarly book-length treatment, Detention in Non-International 
Armed Conflict, Hill-Cawthorne concludes that the customary international 
law concerning procedural guarantees is minimal and inadequate.82 He pro-
poses to build on that law without necessarily suggesting that the additional 
guarantees represented binding international law in 2016. His proposed 
regime (which is primarily aimed at States) would nevertheless address 
armed non-State actors in control of territory and would add to the general 
minimal guarantees identified above various procedural protections. For 
our purposes, I would highlight three which seem to derive mainly from 
international human rights norms:  
 
1. An emphasis on the requirement of a legal basis for detention;83  
 
2. The need for reasons to be given for detention;84 and  
 
3. Prolonged or indefinite detention should lead to a change in the 
level of proof demanded of those seeking to justify continued de-
tention.85  
 
The need for a legal basis for detention has bedeviled the thinking on 
this topic. No State will accept that the armed group it is fighting can de-
velop its own laws for detention, yet such laws are developed and at one 
level they have to be encouraged to give those engaged with armed groups 
the chance to introduce some modicum of fairness and right of review. 
Interestingly, the UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict quotes Article 
6(2)(c) of AP II as one of the requirements for a fair trial: “no one shall be 
held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence, under the law at the time when it was 
committed.”86 The Manual then, having referred to the fact that the French 
text uses the expression le droit national ou international, continues, “[t]he bare 
word ‘law’ must be taken to include both national and international law. It 
                                                                                                                      
82. HILL-CAWTHORNE, supra note 22, at 226.  
83. Id. at 237–38.  
84. Id. at 238.  
85. Id. at 131–32, 242.  
86. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 15.42c (2004). 
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could also be wide enough to cover ‘laws’ passed by an insurgent authori-
ty.”87 If “law” can be read to include laws promulgated by armed groups 
for the purposes of criminal trials, similar laws ought to be relevant for the 
purposes of determining whether the armed group is engaging in arbitrary 
detention and, as Hill-Cawthorne suggests, “they might offer sufficient 
notice . . . of the kind of activity . . . which could lead to internment.”88 It 
therefore seems appropriate to encourage such groups to state the basis on 
which people will be detained and to offer individuals explanations as to 
why they fall into the category resulting in their detention. This need to 
address issues of legality need not be seen as appertaining only to human 
rights law but is inherent to the meaningful operations of the minimum 
guarantees outlined in the section on IHL.  
 
B. The Human Rights to Fair Trial in the Court of an Armed Group 
 
So far we have been discussing the right to challenge detention by an 
armed group. What then of the more extensive guarantees to a fair trial? In 
an early study Theodor Meron sought to list the customary law of fair trial. 
In addition to the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law, Meron included the following: 
 
- The prohibition on retroactive penal measures; 
- The right to the presumption of innocence; 
- The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or con-
fess guilt; 
- The right to be tried in one’s presence and to be represented; 
- The right to examine witnesses against you; and 
- The right to have a sentence or conviction reviewed by a higher 
tribunal according to law.89 
 
The separate customary human rights law origins of this list means that one 
could apply most of these rights to trials by armed groups even outside the 
context of an armed conflict.90 Of course, they may have to be adjusted 
                                                                                                                      
87. Id. ¶ 15.42c n.94. 
88. HILL-CAWTHORNE, supra note 22, at 238.  
89. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOM-
ARY LAW 96 (1989). 
90. UN commissions of inquiry have sometimes chosen to turn to customary human 
rights law when seeking to outline the obligations binding on armed groups. See, e.g., Re-
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depending on the capacity of the group in the particular context to provide 
an appeal instance and appropriate representation, but the general princi-
ples have been applied by human rights organizations in judging the fair-
ness of the justice systems of armed groups.91  
Daragh Murray in his scholarly study Human Rights Obligations of Non-
State Armed Groups has sought to detail how the principal guarantees might 
be interpreted in the context of regulating courts of armed groups. We 
might here summarize some of his key points.  
First, although there may be a trend in human rights law to prohibit the 
trial of civilians in military courts in situations outside armed conflict, such 
a principle may not be appropriate for the courts of armed groups where 
an alternative judicial system may not exist and could not reasonably be 
expected.92  
Second, in order to generate independence and impartiality among the 
group’s judicial branch it may be appropriate to encourage the creation of a 
unit outside the armed group’s chain of command.93  
Third, the human rights requirement of a public trial may have to be ad-
justed in the context of trials by the courts of armed groups, although Mur-
ray suggests that “when an armed group exerts stable territorial control it is 
difficult to envisage justifications for not holding public trials.”94  
Fourth, bearing in mind that the imposition of the death penalty in vio-
lation of fair trial guarantees can constitute a violation of the right to life, 
(and we might add could constitute inhuman treatment), Murray suggests 
an absolute prohibition on the issuance of death sentences by armed 
groups, in particular where such groups operate in States which have abol-
                                                                                                                      
port of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Repub-
lic, ¶ 85, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59 (Feb. 5, 2013) (referring to “customary legal princi-
ples”); see also report by Thomas Hammarberg, Report on Human Rights in the Transnis-
trian Region of the Republic of Moldova 4 (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.undp.org/con 
tent/dam/moldova/docs/Publications/UN_MD_Senior_Expert_Hammarberg_Report_
TN_Human_Rights.pdf (regarding de facto authorities); Daniel Bethlehem, The Methodologi-
cal Framework of the Study, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3, 8 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2001) 
(“[C]ustom may be opposable beyond States, not only to armed opposition groups but 
also to other non-State actors and individuals.”). 
91. Andrew Clapham, Focusing on Armed Non-State Actors, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 803 (Andrew Clapham & Paola 
Gaeta eds., 2014).  
92. MURRAY, supra note 37, at 211. 
93. Id. at 213. 
94. Id. at 219. 
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ished the death penalty.95 I would go further and suggest that because, out-
side combat situations, the human right to life only allows for intentional 
deprivations of life in situations related to the necessity of saving a life or 
preventing serious injury,96 any use of the death penalty by an armed group 
would be a violation of human rights law. To the extent international law 
permits States to impose the death penalty (as evidenced by, for example, 
ICCPR Article 6), that exceptional power can be presumed to be reserved 
to States.   
Of course, where the armed group is a party to an armed conflict and 
there is a necessary link to the conflict, the judicial guarantees referred to in 
Common Article 3, as elaborated in the 2016 ICRC Commentary, and the 
substance of the obligations in Article 75 of AP I, would apply to the 
armed group.97 Furthermore, the provisions of AP II would also apply di-
rectly to the armed group in situations where that treaty is applicable. 
These minimal human rights to fair trial or due process rights could also 
form a useful platform on which to build in contexts where the application 
of the law of armed conflict cannot apply or needs to be complemented.  
Building on the catalogue developed by Meron, we have seen the adop-
tion by a group of experts of the 1990 Turku Declaration of Minimum 
Humanitarian Standards. The Declaration (revised in 1994) is clear that it 
applies to all situations (and not only armed conflicts)98 and that “[t]hese 
standards shall be respected by, and applied to all persons, groups and au-
                                                                                                                      
95. Id. at 220. 
96. See, for example, the draft general comment on the right to life prepared by the 
UN Human Rights Committee which states with regard to self-defense: “and the threat 
responded to must be extreme, involving imminent death or serious injury.” The com-
ment then continues: 
 
The deliberate use of lethal force for law enforcement purposes which is intended to ad-
dress less extreme threats, such as protecting private property or preventing the escape 
from custody of a suspected criminal or a convict who does not pose a serious and immi-
nent threat to the lives or bodily integrity of others, cannot be regarded as a proportionate 
use of force.  
 
U.N. Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No. 36: Article 6 (Right to 
Life), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/R.36/Rev.2, ¶ 18 (Sept. 2, 2015). 
97.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
98. U.N. Secretary-General, Report Prepared Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1995/29, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/80, annex, art. 1 (Nov. 28, 1995).  
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thorities, irrespective of their legal status and without any adverse discrimi-
nation.”99 
The standards include the following articles: 
 
Article 4 
 
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be held in recognized places 
of detention. Accurate information on their detention and wherea-
bouts, including transfers, shall be made promptly available to their 
family members and counsel or other persons having a legitimate inter-
est in the information. 
2. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be allowed to communicate 
with the outside world including counsel in accordance with reasonable 
regulations promulgated by the competent authority. 
3. The right to an effective remedy, including habeas corpus, shall be 
guaranteed as a means to determine the whereabouts or the state of 
health of persons deprived of their liberty and for identifying the au-
thority ordering or carrying out the deprivation of liberty. Everyone 
who is deprived of his or her liberty by arrest or detention shall be enti-
tled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of the detention shall 
be decided speedily by a court and his or her release ordered if the de-
tention is not lawful. 
4. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated humanely, provid-
ed with adequate food and drinking water, decent accommodation and 
clothing, and be afforded safeguards as regards health, hygiene, and 
working and social conditions. 
 
Article 9 
 
No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person 
found guilty of an offence without previous judgement pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by the community of nations. In particular: 
 
a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without de-
lay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him or her, shall 
provide for a trial within a reasonable time, and shall afford the ac-
cused before and during his or her trial all necessary rights and means 
of defence; 
                                                                                                                      
99. Id. art. 2. 
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b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individ-
ual penal responsibility; 
c) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law; 
d) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his or 
her presence; 
e) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to 
confess guilt; 
f) no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for 
which he or she has already been finally convicted or acquitted in ac-
cordance with the law and penal procedure; 
g) no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under ap-
plicable law, at the time when it was committed. 
   
Article 11 
 
If it is considered necessary for imperative reasons of security to subject 
any person to assigned residence, internment or administrative detention, 
such decisions shall be subject to a regular procedure prescribed by law 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
by the international community, including the right of appeal or to a peri-
odical review. 
 
Inevitably, some will be quick to point out that this is not treaty law. 
But a moment’s reflection must lead to the conclusion that States are un-
likely to write a treaty setting out the procedural guarantees that “terrorists” 
must respect when detaining, prosecuting or punishing their captives. In 
the absence of treaty law, or some internationally agreed text, the UN’s 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Re-
public will likely have increasing recourse to these quite detailed guarantees, 
which have never really been formally questioned by States at least insofar 
as they should apply to armed groups. Already the Commission of Inquiry 
has recommended that “[a]rmed groups, in particular the FSA and its local 
groups, should: (a) Adopt and publicly announce rules of conduct that are 
in accordance with international human rights law and other applicable 
international standards, including those reflected in the Declaration of Min-
imum Humanitarian Standards.”100 
                                                                                                                      
100. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic, ¶ 133(a), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2017 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
WITH REGARD TO NON-STATE ACTOR DETENTION IN VIOLATION  
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The focus of this article has been on the obligations of armed groups as 
such. But during my presentation at Harvard University at the 2016 work-
shop “Global Battlefields: The Future of U.S. Detention under Interna-
tional Law,” it became clear that the key interest in this area is on the im-
plications for States of these non-State actor obligations. I therefore pro-
pose very briefly to outline the different legal routes by which the State or 
its agents might be liable for a breach of international law in this context. 
This is a thumbnail sketch; going into the nuances would undermine the 
point of the present contribution which is to highlight the need to develop 
the detailed international obligations which attach to armed non-State ac-
tors. There has been some confusion over the levels of knowledge and 
control that trigger State responsibility. I therefore propose that we break 
down this topic along the following lines: attribution, aid and assistance by 
the State leading to State responsibility for the contribution (State complici-
ty), individual criminal complicity, obligations under Common Article 1 to 
the Geneva Conventions and obligations under human rights law, includ-
ing obligations of prevention under the Genocide Convention and any 
future convention on crimes against humanity. 
 
A. Attribution 
 
Where the group is actually acting as an organ of the State, or is being ef-
fectively controlled by the State, the acts of the group can be attributed to 
that State and the consequences under the law of State responsibility will 
apply. The issue was touched on by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in the Bosnian Genocide judgment where it concluded that the customary 
international law rule in all contexts is that there will be State responsibility 
if the constitutive acts of the “[State’s] organs or persons other than the 
State’s own agents were carried out, wholly or in part, on the instructions or 
directions of the State, or under its effective control.”101 Importantly, the Court 
concluded that the massacres constituting genocide were neither commit-
                                                                                                                      
101. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 401 
(Feb. 26) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Bosnian Genocide].  
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ted on the instructions or under the direction of the State nor that the State 
“exercised effective control over the operations in the course of which those 
massacres . . . were perpetrated.”102  
The ICJ also held that non-State actor acts will be attributable to a State 
where the acts are carried out “by persons or entities which are not formal-
ly recognized as official organs under internal law but which must never-
theless be equated with State organs because they are in a relationship of 
complete dependence on the State.”103 One might think of this as attribution 
through de facto organs of the state, but the ICJ considers this an “excep-
tional” situation which requires a “particularly great degree of State con-
trol”.104 On the facts it was held there was no such dependence with regard 
to the Republika Srpska, the Army of the Republika Srpska or the Scorpi-
ons.  In an earlier case the Court similarly found that there was no requisite 
complete dependence between the contras in Nicaragua and the United 
States.105  
Both these rules of attribution (control over operations and complete 
dependence) would apply to States in such a relationship with an armed 
group that is violating the international obligations incumbent on non-State 
actors with regard to detention. In addition, the acts of the armed group 
will be attributed to a State where the group is acting as a de facto organ of 
the State.   
 
B. Aid and Assistance by the State (State Complicity) 
 
The test for State complicity in the international wrongs of armed non-
State actors was also tackled by the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide judgment. 
Simply stated, a State will be responsible for its contribution to the interna-
tional wrong when it knowingly made a substantial contribution to the 
wrongful act. The case is complicated by the fact that the crime of geno-
cide includes a specific intention and the Court chose not to find that the 
assisting State had knowledge of that intention at the material time. One 
could also get distracted by ideas that there could be State responsibility for 
inciting genocide, as opposed to directing it. But with regard to the interna-
tional wrongs connected to detention by armed groups the situation is 
                                                                                                                      
102. Id. ¶ 413 (emphasis added).  
103. Id. ¶ 406 (emphasis added).  
104. Id. ¶ 393. 
105. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 109–10. (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
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much simpler. The rule on State assistance is reflected in Article 16 of the 
International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility.106 The 
ICJ felt comfortable applying these principles to determining responsibility 
for a State assisting a non-State actor.107 Controversy surrounds the ques-
tion of whether the assisting State need have actual knowledge, imputed 
knowledge, constructive knowledge or presumed knowledge of the use to 
which the assistance would be put.108 Stated another way, should the State 
be responsible where it was negligent, reckless or willfully blind to the con-
sequences of its assistance? 
 We cannot resolve these questions here, not least because there is a 
dearth of relevant State practice. What is clear from the Bosnian Genocide 
judgment is that the assisting State must be aware of the circumstances 
surrounding the unlawful acts and aware that the assistance facilitated those 
acts by the non-State actor.109 In the present context, where human rights 
reports concerning violations by armed non-State actors are regularly sent 
to States, one can assume that the requisite knowledge is likely to be im-
puted to the State.  
  
                                                                                                                      
106. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 43, 47 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2). 
107. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 101, ¶ 420. 
108. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article 1 and State Re-
sponsibility for Non-State Actors, Texas Law Review, 95 TEXAS LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 
2017); JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 405 (2014); Rob-
in Geiß, The Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for the Conventions, in THE 1949 GENE-
VA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 37, at 111; MILES JACKSON, COMPLICITY 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (2015); VLADYSLAV LANOVOY, COMPLICITY AND ITS LIM-
ITS IN THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 218–50 (2016). Brian Finucane’s 
conclusion on State responsibility is of some relevance here: “For example, if an assisting 
State continued to provide assistance to its partner with knowledge of systemic deficien-
cies in its partner’s targeting or detention practices that render LOAC violations more 
likely, there is a risk that the intent by the assisting State to facilitate LOAC violations 
could be inferred.” Brian Finucane, Partners and Legal Pitfalls, 92 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 407, 417 (2016) (He is here referring to assistance to a State partner, but similar 
inferences could be drawn when assisting an armed group.) A recent study carried out at 
Chatham House concluded that Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility had been 
applied by analogy to assistance to armed groups. See HARRIET MOYNIHAN, AIDING AND 
ASSISTING: CHALLENGES IN ARMED CONFLICT AND COUNTERTERRORISM, 23–4 (2016), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-
11-11-aiding-assisting-challenges-armed-conflict-moynihan.pdf.  
109. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 101, ¶ 432.  
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C. Individual Criminal Complicity 
 
The war crime of “unlawful confinement” of a protected person as listed in 
Article 8(2)(a)(vii) of the ICC Statute is a grave breach of the Geneva Con-
ventions and therefore would only apply to an inter-State conflict. It is of 
course possible that an armed group could be under the control of a State 
engaged in an armed conflict with another State or acting as the occupier 
of another State.110 In such a case an individual providing assistance to the 
armed group unlawfully detaining a protected person, either in occupied 
territory or in the controlling State’s own territory, could be prosecuted for 
complicity in this war crime (also a grave breach of Geneva Convention 
IV). Unlawful confinement would include, first, holding someone where 
the decision had been taken on a collective rather than an individual basis 
that the person concerned actually represented a threat to security, and 
second, holding someone whose initial internment may have been lawful, 
but whose confinement became unlawful due to the failure to respect the 
basic procedural rights of the detainee.111 Although the war crime of unlaw-
ful confinement is not listed in the ICC Statute for non-international armed 
conflicts, the ICRC customary IHL study has highlighted that national leg-
islation and various military manuals use terminology which varies from 
“unlawful/illegal confinement and unlawful/illegal detention to arbitrary or 
unnecessary detention,” often applied to non-international armed conflicts. 
This indicates that the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty indeed 
applies in non-international armed conflicts.112     
We have already touched on the other war crime of sentencing or exe-
cution without due process, as found in ICC Statute Article 8(2)(c)(iv) and 
Common Article 3. Here there would be no need to find a nexus to an 
international armed conflict. Individuals who assist in the commission of 
the ICC crimes defined in 8(2)(c)(iv) or the grave breach defined in Article 
                                                                                                                      
110. A 2012 ICRC report concluded that there was agreement among the invited ex-
perts that “a State may be considered an occupying power for the purposes of IHL when 
it enforces overall control over de facto local authorities or other organized groups that 
have effective control over a territory or part thereof.” INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE RED CROSS, OCCUPATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN 
TERRITORY 10 (2012). 
111. DÖRMANN ET AL., supra note 51, at 112–23; see also Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., 
Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 576–82 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia 
Nov. 16, 1998); and on appeal, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 320 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001).  
112. CIHL, supra note 43, at 347. 
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8(2)(a)(vii) will be liable to be found responsible as accomplices under in-
ternational criminal law in line with the modes of liability found in Article 
25 of the ICC Statute, or if prosecuted elsewhere under customary interna-
tional law on accomplice liability, which may arguably be a little wider.113 
To the extent that States have made this war crime triable in their own 
courts, some would consider this a crime of universal jurisdiction in the 
sense that a State may not need to show any jurisdictional link with the 
crime or the defendant.114 Similar individual responsibility could arise for 
complicity in genocide or crimes against humanity (although some debate 
still surrounds the extent to which an armed group needs some State-like 
qualities in order to commit crimes against humanity).115 
  
D. Obligations under Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
 
Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions reads: “The High Contact-
ing Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Con-
vention in all circumstances.” The customary equivalent of this obligation 
was part of the reasoning of the ICJ in the case brought by Nicaragua 
against the United States. Most pertinently, the United States was accused 
of encouraging the contras to violate the provision in Common Article 3 
relating to sentencing or execution without a judgment from a court 
providing effective fair trial guarantees. In the particular circumstances the 
Court was examining a training manual which they found had been sup-
plied by “an agency of the United States” to the armed opposition in Nica-
ragua (Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense)116 and it concluded:  
 
                                                                                                                      
113. See Brief of David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae In Support of the Issuance of a 
Writ of Certiorari, The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 562 U.S. 
946 (2010) (No. 09-1262) (writ of certiorari denied). 
114. See CIHL, supra note 43, r. 157.  
115. See KATHARINE FORTIN, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED GROUPS UNDER 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ch. 10 (forthcoming 2017); WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE 
ATROCITIES: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS AND THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 125–52 
(2012); Tilman Rodenhäuser, Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law, 
Human Rights Law, and International Criminal Law: What Degree of Organization is 
Required? pt. III (2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate Institute of Interna-
tional and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland) (on file with the Graduate Institute 
of International and Development Studies Library). 
116. Nicaragua, supra note 105, ¶ 122. 
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The Court takes note of the advice given in the manual on psychological 
operations to “neutralize” certain “carefully selected and planned targets,” 
including judges, police officers, State Security officials, etc., after the lo-
cal population have been gathered in order to “take part in the act and 
formulate accusations against the oppressor.” In the view of the Court, 
this must be regarded as contrary to the prohibition in Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, with respect to non-combatants, of  
 
“the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without pre-
vious judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording al1 
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples”  
 
and probably also of the prohibition of “violence to life and person, in 
particular murder to all kinds, . . .”.117  
 
In the following paragraph the Court uses an awareness test and con-
cludes that “at the relevant time those responsible for the issue of the 
manual were aware of, at the least, allegations that the behavior of the con-
tras in the field was not consistent with humanitarian law.”118 The publica-
tion and dissemination of the manual was held to be “encouragement, 
which was likely to be effective, to commit acts contrary to general princi-
ples of international humanitarian law reflected in treaties.”119 The Court 
seems to be saying that the encouragement was in violation of the principle 
to respect and ensure respect for IHL as the relevant acts of the contras 
were violations of IHL.  
Hathaway and her fellow authors have highlighted these passages and 
suggested that one can take this reasoning a step further and, based on a 
reading of the 2016 ICRC Commentary, determine that there is a positive 
obligation on States to prevent violations of Common Article 3 by non-
State actors.120 This argument that the Geneva Conventions contain some 
sort of due diligence obligation on States warrants close attention, but 
would take us beyond the focus of this contribution. For ease of reference 
here are the key paragraphs from the Commentary: 
 
                                                                                                                      
117. Id. ¶ 255. 
118. Id. ¶ 256. 
119. Id. 
120. Hathaway et al., supra note 108. 
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The duty to ensure respect covers not only the armed forces and other 
persons or groups acting on behalf of the High Contracting Parties but 
extends to the whole of the population over which they exercise authori-
ty, i.e. also to private persons whose conduct is not attributable to the 
State. This constitutes a general duty of due diligence to prevent and re-
press breaches of the Conventions by private persons over which a State 
exercises authority, including persons in occupied territory. This is an ob-
ligation of means, whose content depends on the specific circumstances, 
in particular the foreseeability of the violations and the State’s knowledge 
thereof, the gravity of the breach, the means reasonably available to the 
State and the degree of influence it exercises over the private persons.121  
 
The duty to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions is particularly 
strong in the case of a partner in a joint operation, even more so as this 
case is closely related to the negative duty neither to encourage nor to aid 
or assist in violations of the Conventions. The fact, for example, that a 
High Contracting Party participates in the financing, equipping, arming or 
training of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict, or even plans, carries 
out and debriefs operations jointly with such forces, places it in a unique 
position to influence the behaviour of those forces, and thus to ensure re-
spect for the Conventions.122  
 
E. Positive Obligations under Human Rights Law and the Law on the Prevention of 
Genocide and Crimes against Humanity 
 
Human rights treaty law has developed an impressive jurisprudence with 
regard to what are known as “positive obligations.” These would include 
an obligation to protect people from infringements of their rights by armed 
non-State actors. The subject is complex and dependent in part on the spe-
cific treaty being considered, the ambition of the treaty monitoring body or 
court, and the vexing question of the extent of extraterritorial human rights 
treaty obligations. The general principle can be best seen at work in Gen-
eral Comment 31 of the UN Human Rights Committee:  
 
[T]he positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will 
only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just 
against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts 
                                                                                                                      
121. 2016 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 30, ¶ 150, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org 
/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=72239588AFA6
6200C1257F7D00367DBD (footnotes omitted).  
122. Id. ¶ 167.   
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committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment 
of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application between 
private persons or entities. There may be circumstances in which a failure 
to ensure Covenant rights as required by article 2 would give rise to viola-
tions by States Parties of those rights, as a result of States Parties’ permit-
ting or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to 
prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by 
private persons or entities.123 
 
At the regional level, the ECtHR, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights have on 
several occasions found States in violation of their human rights obliga-
tions where they have failed to prevent, prosecute or punish violations 
committed by non-State actors.124 Such obligations are also sometimes 
known as duties to protect. They obviously apply as a matter of interna-
tional law to the States parties to the treaties. The extent to which it makes 
sense to speak about positive obligations under human rights law for 
armed groups is only now being explored.125 At this point the focus should 
perhaps be less on law and more on what makes sense in terms of engaging 
with those groups that are seeking to present themselves as governments in 
waiting with a full understanding of what good governance entails.126  
With respect to the Genocide Convention,127 it is not hard to imagine 
that some sorts of detention or prosecution policies by armed groups could 
amount to genocide. Suffice it to mention Article 2(d) which includes as 
genocide “[i]mposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
                                                                                                                      
123. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004). 
124. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATION OF NON-STATE ACTORS 
ch. 9 (2006); ALASTAIR MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UN-
DER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2004). In some cases this positive obligation is said to be mixed with 
attribution of the acts of the non-State actor to the State. See JACKSON, supra note 108, ch. 
8. 
125. See GENEVA CALL, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS OF ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS: 
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES (2016), http://www.genevacall.org/wp-content/uploads/d 
lm_uploads/2016/08/GaranceTalks_Issue01_Report.pdf. 
126. FORTIN, supra note 115, at 3–7; REBEL GOVERNANCE IN CIVIL WAR (Ana 
Arjona et al. eds., 2015); JEREMY M. WEINSTEIN, INSIDE REBELLION: THE POLITICS OF 
INSURGENT VIOLENCE (2007). 
127. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 
9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
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group.” The question arises when would a State be held responsible for 
failure to prevent such acts by an armed group. As we saw above, the ICJ 
in the Bosnian Genocide judgment has set out the rules for attribution to the 
State and for State complicity in the acts of the armed group. A separate 
test relates to the positive obligations incumbent on the State. The Court 
spelled out the relevant criteria before going on to find that Serbia had 
failed to take the appropriate action and was therefore responsible for fail-
ing in its duty to prevent genocide by the relevant armed group: 
 
A State does not incur responsibility simply because the desired result is 
not achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly 
failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its 
power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide. In 
this area the notion of “due diligence,” which calls for an assessment in 
concreto, is of critical importance. Various parameters operate when as-
sessing whether a State has duly discharged the obligation concerned. The 
first, which varies greatly from one State to another, is clearly the capacity 
to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already 
committing, genocide. This capacity itself depends, among other things, 
on the geographical distance of the State concerned from the scene of the 
events, and on the strength of the political links, as well as links of all 
other kinds, between the authorities of that State and the main actors in 
the events. The State’s capacity to influence must also be assessed by legal 
criteria, since it is clear that every State may only act within the limits 
permitted by international law; seen thus, a State’s capacity to influence 
may vary depending on its particular legal position vis-à-vis the situations 
and persons facing the danger, or the reality, of genocide.128 
 
Although a proposed convention on crimes against humanity has yet to 
be drafted and adopted, the early work by the International Law Commis-
sion suggests that an analogous provision on the duty to prevent crimes 
against humanity is likely to be included. In this way a State party that failed 
to exert its influence over an armed group engaged in enforced disappear-
ances as a crime against humanity could find itself in violation of its treaty 
obligations due to the detention policies of an armed group. Such a duty to 
“employ the means at its disposal to prevent persons or groups not directly 
under its authority from committing crimes against humanity” has been 
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foreseen in the draft articles by the members of the International Law 
Commission.129  
 
VI. FINAL REMARKS  
 
The international community has proven to be incredibly coy about dis-
cussing the obligations of armed groups with regard to detention. When it 
comes to discussing who may be detained and the procedures for challeng-
ing such detention there is a weird sort of silence. This is, of course, under-
standable as there are knock-on effects in any such discussion. If there is 
no right to detain fighters from the other side or dangerous civilians, what 
does that tell us about the State’s own rights under international law? If one 
starts to set out procedures and prohibitions, will that not legitimize the 
behavior of those that comply? The problems are exacerbated for interna-
tional organizations whose members do not want to see such potentially 
legitimizing behavior towards those who would seek to overthrow them. 
Non-governmental organizations similarly have to tread carefully for fear 
of being charged with material assistance to terrorism. 
Nevertheless, I have argued that we should bite the bullet and seek to 
set out some of the principles that are already being applied to armed 
groups and engage with them to ensure that those who come under their 
control are treated with respect for their dignity in a fair and predictable 
way. I have sought to avoid doctrinal discussion about which branch of 
international law represents the best fit for these groups. The truth is that 
they may often be operating outside the strict definition of what constitutes 
an armed conflict, yet there is a need to monitor their behavior and ensure 
some sort of protection to the individuals detained by such groups.  
Of course, in designing any engagement one would have to take into 
account the very different contexts that operate in this realm. The rationale 
and incentives for armed groups will differ depending on whether they are 
seeking to take over the State, form a new State or are simply out to enrich 
themselves. Their justice arrangements may also be influenced by whether 
they are protecting the population from State-counterinsurgency violence 
                                                                                                                      
129. Mathias Forteau, Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Statement during the 
Sixty-seventy Session of the International Law Commission: Crimes against Humanity at 8 
(June 5, 2015), http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/statements 
/2015_dc_chairman_statement_crimes_against_humanity.pdf&lang=EF. 
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or whether they are themselves primarily responsible for the oppression.130 
In turn, such categories, or others which highlight ideology, religion, griev-
ance or greed, should not determine whether or not one should engage, or 
whether or not the armed groups have obligations; they can only help to 
shape the form of engagement. Social science research reveals how even 
those groups that are primarily about enrichment might still pretend to 
develop forms of justice to satisfy foreign investors and to court interna-
tional legitimacy.131 Where the economy of the group depends on local 
support the dynamic will be different as local justice procedures may need 
to satisfy noncombatants on whom the group depends. Moreover, the na-
ture and characteristics of a group can change over time. In many contexts 
detention may not be a considered option, for some groups governance 
may rely “on a last resort threat of imposing capital punishment or exile on 
people who did not obey.”132  
Whether or not we are able to engage with the armed groups them-
selves, the last part of this article showed how a theory of obligations for 
armed groups is essential to understanding the secondary obligations of 
States in this context. Although litigation beyond war crimes prosecutions 
is unlikely to be pursued against armed groups, there are more and more 
opportunities for States to be held accountable for directing or assisting 
armed groups in their violations of international law, and, of course, in the 
context of genocide and crimes against humanity the State would be wise 
to exercise due diligence in any situation where it is in a position to exercise 
influence over armed groups that are likely to commit such acts.  
We need to talk about detention by armed groups, and we need to 
fashion a more protective regime. We should banish any nightmares about 
the bogeyman of legitimacy and take responsibility for elaborating clear 
rules and procedures to be followed by those armed groups who are de-
taining our fellow human beings.  
 
 
                                                                                                                      
130. Nelson Kasfir, Rebel Governance—Constructing a Field of Inquiry: Definitions, Scope, 
Patterns, Order, Causes, in REBEL GOVERNANCE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 126, at 21. 
131. William Reno, Predatory Rebellions and Governance: The National Patriotic Front of Libe-
ria, 1989–1993, in id. at 265.  
132. Francisco Guttiérrez-Sanin, Organization and Governance: The Evolution of Urban Mi-
litias in Medellin, Columbia, in id. at 246, 263. 
